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When a UK minister announces plans for a ‘world-leading’ UK digitally enabled 
service, most of us remember Prime Minister Johnson’s ‘world-beating’ track and trace 
App and wait for another U-turn. 
With post-Brexit politics and economics, however, the risks arising from policy decisions and 
international commitments based on possibly unrealistic assumptions about border control 
technology, such as ETA (Electronic Travel Authorisation), are so much greater, and a U-turn 
might not be an option. 
The vision at the core of the ETA announcement of a Britain that is more open and generous 
to the world is wholly different from that conveyed by Farage’s shameful poster that helped 
to garner the Brexit vote. ETA and the travel and migration policies that it will support will 
welcome ‘people based on the skills they have to offer and how they will contribute to the 
UK, not where their passport comes from’. Also, we are informed that risks stemming from 
wider and easier access will be fully covered. Technology will create ‘the world’s most 
effective border, one that enables prosperity and enhances security for Global Britain’, for 
instance, conviction information will be used to identify unsuitable or risky people. 
Striking an effective, fair and fundamental rights compliant balance between easier visitor or 
migrant travel authorisation and risk prevention or, if that fails, an effective criminal justice 
response to crimes committed by foreign residents is a challenge for wealthier democracies, 
but this has to be addressed proportionately. For instance, contrary to right-wing propaganda, 
there was never a UK crime wave caused by Single Market Freedom of Movement. 
Prosecution data analysed by a team led my colleague Derek Johnson in fact reveals a lower 
level of offending than basic demographics would have suggested. Nevertheless, it is always 
important to find the few people in the generally law-abiding and tax-paying crowd crossing 
the border who pose a significant risk. The EU developed a holistic response to this 
challenge; a comprehensive system of digitalised information sharing, mutual trust in 
investigative and judicial cooperation and budget transfers to enable less wealthy member 
state participation in such cooperation, all underpinned by data protection and fundamental 
rights provisions in EU criminal law. 
Such cooperation is not just relevant to a small minority of foreign neighbours and 
colleagues. The EU (for some aspects EEA) system – much of it retained in the 2021 Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement – is equally critical for denying UK criminals impunity by 
slipping across EU borders, and in maintaining comprehensive UK safeguarding in education 
and for vulnerable people. 
It would be reckless for at least three reasons for the UK Government to make international 
commitments or policy decisions that rely on assumptions about full ETA operational 
effectiveness ‘for everyone who interacts with the immigration system and crosses the 
border’ by the end of 2024. 
Firstly, technology project risks: the ETA is part of a comprehensive and long-delayed 
renewal of UK border control technology. This project began in 2003, was reconfigured after 
the costly failure of E-borders with a view to completion in 2019 but was reset in that year to 
2022 and 2024 because of policy ‘changes, scope creep and poor programme performance’ . 
Secondly, even the most brilliantly functional e-travel authorisation system depends on 
access to reliable information. If such information is not available there is no alternative to 
traditional pre-travel interviews, document scrutiny and inquiries by government staff in the 
country of departure. Presumably, this partly explains why the US visa-waiver program 
(delivered by its Electronic Travel Authorization system) is only available to the nationals 
and sometimes the residents of 39 countries and territories? Missing from that list are many 
countries central to ‘Global Britain’ market aspirations that might have an access price-tag. 
India and the PRC are excluded and, except for Australia, Japan Taiwan, South Korea and 
New Zealand, all Pacific countries together with all of Africa and most of Latin 
America. Australia’s similar visa-waiver schemes cover an almost identical selection of 
countries. 
Thirdly, UK border scrutiny has historically been concentrated mainly on 33% of foreign 
arrivals (i.e., those from outside the EEA). Information flows and cooperation are even more 
EU-centric: for example, 86% of information about UK citizens’ foreign convictions, 94% of 
requests from for information about criminal convictions in the UK and about 99% of 
authorised extraditions. Any pivot away from EEA countries of origin to the rest of the world 
is likely to be costly and, if the same level of information reliability cannot be guaranteed, 
would significantly damage border security. 
ETA dependent treaty commitments and policy decisions – ranging from travel and migrant 
access needed to secure trade deals to staff cuts in the countries of departure or the 
privatisation of critical elements of the authorisation process – need to wait until ETA is 
proven to be fully operational and effective, including evidence of the system’s access to 
reliable relevant information. 
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